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COMMENTS ON "MIRACLES AND THE 
LAWS OF NATURE" 
Joshua Hoffman 
In his interesting and challenging paper, "Miracles and the Laws of Nature," 
George Mavrodes explores the controversial issue of whether or not Hume's 
influential definition of a miracle is compatible with certain equally influential 
conceptions of a law of nature. If I understand him, Mavrodes comes to two 
important conclusions. The first is that Hume's definition of a miracle is not 
compatible with a Regularity theory of laws of nature. The second is that a 
statement of a law of nature should be understood as being of the form, 'neces-
sarily, (x)(Fx :::J Gx),' where 'necessarily' is a modal operator of nomic necessity, 
and where the truth of such a statement is consistent with its being the case that 
Fa & ~ Ga. In arguing for his second conclusion, Mavrodes draws an analogy 
between laws of nature and humanly legislated laws. He says that just as the 
existence of the latter are in a certain sense compatible with their violation, 
transgression, or contravention, so in an analogous sense are the former. 
While I am inclined to agree with Mavrodes's contention made in the course 
of his discussion that the Regularity theory of laws of nature is inadequate, I do 
not share his view that the Humean definition of a miracle is incompatible with 
this theory. I will argue, instead, that the Regularity theory can make sense of 
the idea of a transgression of a law of nature. Nor do I find Mavrodes's second 
main conclusion persuasive, that the truth of a statement of a law of nature is 
consistent with the existence of a counter-example to the universally quantified 
material conditional in the scope of the nomic necessity operator. I will argue 
that on Mavrodes' s view, statements of laws of nature are weaker than the 
corresponding universally quantified material conditionals, whereas, in truth, 
such law-statements must be stronger, not weaker, than the conditionals in 
question. I will further argue that a more plausible way to allow for the transgres-
sing of a law of nature in conformity with Hume's definition of a miracle is to 
understand such a law as containing implicit boundary conditions. These boundary 
conditions specify what it is that makes these laws laws of nature. 
Hume, it will be recalled, defines a miracle as an event which (i) is a transgres-
sion of a law of nature, and (ii) is brought about by a particular volition of the 
Deity. In his paper, Mavrodes concentrates on the first clause of this definition. 
He examines an argument put forward by Alastair McKinnon, who says that 
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"The idea of a suspension of a natural law is self-contradictory ... [Natural laws ] 
are simply highly generalized shorthand descriptions of how things do in fact 
happen ... " (quoted by Mavrodes, p. 6) Thus, McKinnon assumes that laws of 
nature are reports of regularities, of how things actually happen. In other words, 
McKinnon assumes a Regularity theory of laws of nature. From this, McKinnon 
reasons to the conclusion that miracles are impossible, that is, logically impos-
sible. So far as I can tell, the following is an adequate rendering of McKinnon's 
argument: 
(i) Laws of nature are merely highly generalized descriptions of 
how things do in fact happen. 
(ii) Suppose that a miracle happens. 
(iii) Then something in fact happens which is not consistent with 
any highly generalized description of how things do in fact 
happen. 
(iv) But of any actual sequence of events there is of necessity a 
highly generalized description. (McKinnon: "Hence, any-
thing which happens, even an apparent miracle, happens ac-
cording to laws ... ") 
(v) Therefore, nothing can happen which is not consistent with 
any highly generalized description of how things do in fact 
happen. 
(vi) Therefore, a miracle cannot happen. 
McKinnon's argument as here rendered is a valid reductio of the claim that a 
miracle happens. It seemingly requires as premises only the assumption of a 
Regularity theory of laws of nature and a highly plausible Leibnizean principle 
concerning the possibility of subsuming any pattern under a general formula or 
principle. 
After introducing this argument, Mavrodes observes that one may accept 
McKinnon's argument and retain some notion of a miracle, but then one must 
reject Hume's definition linking miracles to laws of nature. This is a course 
Mavrodes chooses not to take. Instead, he takes on McKinnon's argument. So 
far as I can tell, Mavrodes concedes to McKinnon that on a Regularity theory 
of laws of nature, miracles are logically impossible. But he challenges the premise 
in McKinnon's argument which assumes the Regularity theory on the grounds 
that the Regularity theory is unacceptable. I 
It is interesting to observe that if Mavrodes were right about the incompatibility 
of Hume's concept of a miracle and the Regularity theory, and if, as most 
commentators agree, Hume himself holds a Regularity theory of laws of nature, 
then we would be faced with the difficult choice of concluding either that Hume 
failed to see this consequence of his own views, or else that he did see it but 
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chose not to take advantage of it in his attack on miracles. This consequence of 
the McKinnon-Mavrodes position for the interpretation of Hume is not a decisive 
criticism of that position, of course, but it should at least give us pause. 
I think it highly unlikely that Hume would have accepted McKinnon's argu-
ment, and, in my view, he would have been right not to do so. While I agree 
with Mavrodes that that argument is unsound, and also that its first premise is 
false, I do not agree that it shows the Regularity theory of laws of nature to be 
incompatible with the possibility of Humean miracles. There is something else 
wrong with McKinnon's first premise, something more basic than its assumption 
of the Regularity theory, and something which accounts for the apparent result 
that miracles and the Regularity theory are incompatible. McKinnon's first 
premise says that laws of nature are merely highly generalized descriptions of 
how things do in fact happen. But this is not what the Regularity theory of laws 
of nature ought to say. It ought to say that laws of nature are merely highly 
generalized descriptions of how physical or natural things, i.e., sequences of 
physical events, do in fact happen. Suppose that in addition to physical substances 
and things there are also spiritual substances, including God and finite souls. 
Then the conscious states of these souls are not physical events, and so their 
occurrences fall outside of the laws of nature in some sense. Furthermore, if 
such souls can by willing bring about changes in the physical world that would 
not otherwise have happened, then physical events can occur whose occurrences 
do not in some sense fall under any law of nature. I suggest, then, that a law 
of nature of the RegUlarity theory is roughly of the following form: '(x)(Fx :=J 
Gx, unless a spiritual being by willing brings about something incompatible with 
Gx).' I ignore here the insertion of the appropriate temporal indices, and I assume 
for the sake of simplicity that spiritual agents are the only type of supernatural 
beings that need be considered. The clause, 'by willing brings about something ... ' 
is itself causal, and is therefore to be analyzed in terms of regularities, in this 
case, regularities involving willings and what follows them. But these regularities, 
or laws, are not regularities or laws of nature, but laws of a non-natural or 
supernatural sort, involving as they do non-physical events and things. 
If we understand a law of nature along these lines, then a so-called "violation" 
or "transgression," etc., of a law of nature occurs just when we have Fa but not 
Ga. This is not an occurrence which is logically incompatible with a law of 
nature, it is merely an occurrence which we could not have had unless some 
non-natural event or events had interfered with or disrupted the normal natural 
course of events. Hence, I agree with those, including McKinnon and Mavrodes 
as well, that strictly speaking a law of nature cannot (it is logically impossible 
for it to be) subject to counter-example. Where we disagree is over just how we 
are to construe the sense in which laws of nature can, in principle, be subject 
to transgression or violation. I have argued that we should construe the laws of 
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nature as implicitly having built into them, as it were, boundary conditions which 
state under what conditions we can expect certain sequences of physical events 
to obtain. Any theory of laws of nature which allows for the possibility of 
non-natural forces or influences should construe laws of nature as having such 
boundary conditions built into them. Thus, the problem of how a Humean miracle 
is consistent with the laws of nature is not a special problem for the Regularity 
theorist; it is a problem on any theory of laws of nature. If I am right, each such 
theory should solve the problem in the same way. 
Mavrodes, however, appears to believe that the problem is a problem which 
is special to the Regularity theory. He therefore rejects that theory as the only 
way of solving the problem. He proposes that we take a realistic view of laws 
of nature, hoping thereby to show how Humean miracles can be compatible with 
the laws of nature. As I have said, I am inclined to agree with Mavrodes that a 
realistic or nomic theory of laws of nature is more plausible than the RegUlarity 
theory. I propose, therefore, to ignore those parts of Mavrodes's paper where 
he argues the superiority of the nomic to the Regularity theory. Instead, I want 
to consider how Mavrodes thinks we are to understand a realistic theory of laws 
of nature. 
Mavrodes says that we should understand a law of nature as what is asserted 
by a statement of nomic necessity, i.e., as a statement of the form, 'necessarily, 
(x)(Fx ::J Gx).' He then argues in such a way as to imply that this nomic necessity 
is such that the sort of statement just indicated does not entail that (x)(Fx ::J 
Gx). It is then open to Mavrodes to hold that Fa & - Ga is compatible with 
necessarily, (x)(Fx ::J Gx). In what sense, then, is a miracle (say Fa & - Ga) 
a violation of a law of nature? Only in the sense that it is logically incompatible 
with (x)(Fx ::J Gx). I must confess that I find it utterly mysterious how, on 
Mavrodes's view, Fa & - Ga can be logically incompatible with (x)(Fx ::J Gx), 
but not logically incompatible with necessarily, (x)(Fx ::J Gx). How, in other 
words, is the fact that a statement is nomically necessary supposed to weaken 
the force of that which is asserted to be nomic ally necessary? This is indeed 
paradoxical, for the standard and I think only coherent view is that a nomic ally 
necessary statement is stronger than the corresponding material conditional and 
entails it. Mavrodes does, to be sure, try to make sense out of this by drawing 
an analogy between laws of nature and humanly legislated laws. A law of the 
latter sort, say, that murder shall not be done, is, Mavrodes points out, logically 
compatible with there occurring a murder. Such a law might be understood as 
being of the form, 'necessarily, there is no murder,' where the term, 'necessarily,' 
means something like "it is a law of the land that." The obtaining of this law is 
logically compatible with there being a murder, even though the statement in 
the scope of the legal necessity operator (if I may call it that) is not logically 
compatible with there being a murder. The analogy with Mavrodes's theory of 
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how nomic laws are compatible with miracles should be obvious. But this analogy 
is seriously flawed, for the legislative law-statement is not a genuine statement 
at all but a mere imperative. In other words, a legislative law is not a descriptive 
statement like a law of nature. It is this difference alone which accounts for the 
fact that an occurrence can be logically compatible with the legislative law but 
not with the embedded categorical statement. In effect, the legislative necessity 
operator weakens the embedded statement by converting it from a statement to 
an imperative. The nomic necessity operator has, of course, no such function. 
Thus, the analogy between legislati ve laws and laws of nature does not hold up. 
What I have argued implies, I think, that the possibility of reconciling laws 
of nature and Humean miracles depends first on our being able to draw a distinc-
tion between the natural course of events and a course of events in which the 
supernatural, and specifically the divine, intervenes. It depends, secondly, on 
our understanding laws of nature as asserting only what happens without exception 
or what must happen in the natural course of events. But it appears that on 
certain views of the nature of reality, it is not clear that the distinction between 
the natural course of events and a course of events in which the supernatural 
intervenes can be drawn in the way required by our reconciling project. Obviously, 
someone who regards spiritual beings and forces as impossible will regard 
Humean miracles as impossible. Not so obviously, certain anti-materialist systems 
may be forced to the same conclusion. For example, consider Berkeley's system, 
where every "physical" event is caused by God, and where physical objects have 
no inner dispositions of their own (ideas being utterly passive). Does not the 
domain of the natural in this scheme fall completely under the domain of the 
supernatural? And if so, must it not be the case on Hume's definition either that 
every physical event is miraculous, or else that no such event is? One could try 
to define a miracle in Berkeley's system as a highly unusual effect of God's 
will, or as a deviation from God's habitual willings, etc., but this raises the 
serious problem of distinguishing the highly unusual from the miraculous. Fur-
thermore, why does the miraculous need to be highly unusual? Hume's definition 
of a miracle is quite consistent with the occurrence of miracles being regular 
and patterned (though it may not be consistent with some of the things Hume 
says in his epistemological attack on miracles). It might be thought that Leibniz 
tried to solve this very problem in his Discourse on Metaphysics, but the solution 
does not seem to me to conform to Hume's definition. I'm not certain that there 
is no reconciling the possibility of a Humean miracle with Berkeley's 
metaphysics, but as yet I see no way to do so. But even if I am right, this no 
more tends to show that there is something defective about Hume's definition 
than does its incompatibility with certain strong materialist world-views. 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
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NOTE 
1. Mavrodes is not alone in thinking that the possibility of miracles on Hume's definition is 
incompatible with the Regularity theory. Both Antony Flew (Hume's Philosophy of Belief) and 
J.C.A. Gaskin (Hume's Philosophy of Religion) argue along similar lines. 
